I copied this link in by error yesterday, but it’s good enough to warrant a proper writeup.
If you go in to defensive security with a ‘normal person’ mindset, you quickly start feeling like a man trying to identify a battleship — at night, from a rowboat, with a maglite. (duct tape headband optional)
This is stupid, and only leaves you feeling helpless. For better or worse, you have to get in touch with your inner obssessive-compulsive and start paying attention to the details. The author cites Locard’s Exchange Principle (http://science.howstuffworks.com/locards-exchange-principle.htm/printable) as the granddaddy of secret weapons for the defense: in short, the adversary is leaving tracks on anything he touches. You can see every move he makes if you have the time, knowledge, and resources to identify the traces.
(If anyone’s wondered why I’ve mentioned a variety of ‘seal’ solutions — from photographing towels to making holograms — this a big reason why.)
Computer security types do have to be careful about trading off privacy for visibility. There’s no point to collecting piles of data to get earlier notice of a rare attack, if it means violating the privacy of hundreds or thousands. (Stasi/MfS lesson time: They tried this, and still East Germany was among the first to fall. It made for great slogans, though. “Freedom for my file!”)
“Security professionals are fraught with crazy obstacles unseen in other parts of the technology space. For example, we are often fighting enemies we cannot see. They out-maneuver us by attacking our partners, informational supply-chain, and even the people. But they are not completely invisible if we know what to look for.
There was a recent thread on the SIRA mailing list that discussed the concept of “non-observables,” or elements in the security space that cannot be feasibly observed by defenders. These elements, in theory, would be critical in event detection, thus providing defenders with better capabilities to shrink the window of vulnerability.
This is a foolish notion that leads security people into an unnecessary state of helplessness. Consider Locard’s Exchange Principle.
The perpetrator of a crime will always bring something into a crime scene and leave with something from the crime scene. Thus, any action will invariably cause the exchange of matter between the two parties (or evidence of a crime in the case of something committed at a distance).
This notion transfers well into the electronic crime world, but it requires better visibility into our infrastructure. We have to have better ability to collect events of all kinds, however innocuous they appear, and build analytics and trends across them. Attackers will leave traces of their actions as they interact with systems, just artifacts of our systems will be left on their machines (albeit, often temporary).
I argue there are no such things as non-observables in the security space, at least nothing relevant to a defender. Everything is observable, as long as you have the right technology. Some argue that a user forgetting his password is a non-observable event. Since we do not yet have the ability to read minds, we can’t tell if a user remembers his password either (and frankly, that is irrelevant). We can only observe his behavior when he interacts with the system—either a successful or failed authentication.
“Now Branden,” I can hear you ask, “that doesn’t necessarily prove that the successful authentication wasn’t performed by an unauthorized user!” Correct, but that authentication in context with any other actions become a fingerprint for the interaction. Where is the user originating from? What does this user typically do? Are they operating in a way that is typical, or atypical?
We can only understand the answers to these questions when the actor makes a move on the system in question. Once an action is taken, we observe what happens, and then make our move (to defend the system or to do nothing… remember inaction is still an action). We can do this with ample data and analytics, but we must choose to capture and use it. Behavior-based controls are the present (future) of defense.
Would we invest in this for compliance? No way. But then again, we shouldn’t be spending only for compliance, now should we?”